Thought Control and Halacha, Part 1

Several weeks ago I received an email asking about the intersection of psychology and halacha with regard to mandated and proscribed thought. How far does the Torah go in prohibiting certain thoughts, and is such a thing even possible? The following discussion is neither exhaustive nor halachic, but it presents the topic as it has occurred to me as I have thought about the question.

Categories of Thought

There are several levels of halachically categorized thought. 

On the most sustained level, there is belief, about which we have mitzvot such as the 1st dibrah (commandment, i.e., "I am the Eternal, your G-d...") and the Rambam's ikarim (Maimonedes' 13 principals of faith). (See also Ramchal's Daat Tevonot for a much longer discussion and the Shaar HaYichud VeHaemuna from the Tanya). Those fundamental mitzvot of faith point to the centrality of thought as a means of individuals' fulfilling a purpose of creation, Kevod Shamayim, and generally bringing about the universal, eschatological object of Yichud Hashem (the revelation of G-d's Unity), along the lines of "Umalah haaretz daat et Hashem." 

The Torah also relates halachically to certain attitudes such as the kavod and yir'ah (honor and awe) required toward parents, the ahava (love) required toward one's fellow and, in particular, converts, and the hatred that one is prohibited from harboring "in [his or her] heart." I refer to them as attitudes rather than feelings because they are more cognitive than the mitzvot of affect such as "vesamachata bechagecha" (rejoicing on the holiday) and mourning for a loved one or for the Temple. However, those two categories are alike in that while the mitzot in both are, in essence, internal and abstract, they are given behavioral parameters. For example, honoring one's parents involves doing things to help them and having awe means not doing things such as sitting in their seats. Similarly, having joy on the holidays entails eating meat and drinking wine.

A more delimited form of thought is remembering. In the context of mitzvot, this is operationalized as active recollection, or self-reminding, as opposed to the passive state of not having forgotten that pertains, for instance, to the validity of a witness' testimony. Examples of this include the 6 remembrances mentioned in the Torah and typically found in siddurim at the end of the Shacharit service. These include remembering: (a) the Exodus Egypt (Deut 6:3); (b) the incident of the golden calf (Deut 9:7); (c) the giving of the Torah at Sinai (Deut 4:9- 10); (d) the Sabbath (Exodus 20:8); (e) the attack of Amalek (Deut 25:17-19); and (f) Miriam's tzaraat (Deut 24:9, Numbers 12:10).

A, perhaps, more involved form of thought is referred to by chazal (the early rabbis) as hirhur, or contemplation. This involves actively considering a matter to the point that the endeavor takes on some of the behavioral properties of speech, with various ramifications. Thus, for example, there are opinions that hirhur is "ke'dibur" (serves as speech) in the context of learning Torah (with implications for reciting a blessing beforehand) counting the omer, and reciting the Shema, among others. This term is also applied to fantasizing about illicit acts, as will be discussed below. In the context of Shabbat, where discussion of mundane matters is prohibited, there is an explicit drasha (hermeneutical derivation) that permits mundane hirhur. 

Two forms of intent have relevance in the context of particular actions that they accompany. These are kavanah (mindfulness), and daat (consent). Kavanah is a form of intentionality that qualitatively shapes a person's fulfillment of a mitzvah. Certain mitzvot are more dependent on, or sensitive to, kavanah than others. Typically, action-based mitzvot can be fulfilled without the requisite kavanah, although doing so is less than ideal. (The particulars of this rule are the subject of lengthy halachic discussions that are beyond the present scope). Tefilah (prayer), on the other hand requires a certain minimal level of kavanah in order to have meaning. (See the first piece in Rav Haim Solovietchik's Chiddushei Rav Chaim al HaRambam). In addition, "negative" kavanah can prevent an act from constituting the fulfillment of a mitzvah in situations where the individual explicitly intends for it not to be.